Re: [RFC] arm: Handle starting up in secure mode

[Sonny Rao]

On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:25 AM, Christopher Covington
<cov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 09/16/2014 05:24 PM, Christopher Covington wrote:
>> On 09/16/2014 05:09 PM, Christopher Covington wrote:
>>> ARM Linux currently has the most features available to it in hypervisor
>>> (HYP) mode, so switch to it when possible. This can also ensure proper
>>> reset of newer registers such as CNTVOFF.
>>>
>>> The permissions on the Non-Secure Access Control Register (NSACR) are
>>> used to probe what the security setting currently is when in supervisor
>>> (SVC) mode.
>>
>> Sorry, this doesn't work yet. I was misinterpreting my test results. For what
>> it's worth, my testing and development methodology is to run it after hacked
>> up versions of the semihosting bootwrapper on the simulator that corresponds
>> to rtsm_ve-aemv8a.dtb (AEM VE FVP these days?) and examine the instruction traces.
>
> Looks like the real problem was that I was hacking up the bootwrapper
> incorrectly--my start-in-secure-mode bootwrapper variant wasn't setting up the
> GIC for non-secure access. With that changed, I've tested the following
> variations using the Image file in a single core configuration.
>
> Start in non-secure SVC with non-secure access to GIC configured.
>
> Start in secure SVC with non-secure access to GIC configured.

I tried this on my rk3288 which boots in secure SVC mode, but I must
be missing the GIC configuration for non-secure access because I get a
message like this:
[    0.000000] GIC CPU mask not found - kernel will fail to boot.
[    0.000000] GIC CPU mask not found - kernel will fail to boot.
....
and then it hangs here:
[    0.116871] CPU0: thread -1, cpu 0, socket 5, mpidr 80000500
[    0.123274] Setting up static identity map for 0x5e3bf8 - 0x5e3c50

So I need to figure out how to enable non-secure access to the GIC work.

> Start in secure SVC with non-secure access to GIC configured and hypervisor
> support disabled in the model (-C cluster.has_el2=0). This required setting
> the VBAR again in non-secure SVC but with that fix it seems to work. I'll
> include this change in v2.
>
> I have not been able to start up the bootwrapper with secure monitor support
> disabled in the model (-C cluster.has_el3=0) because of faults during GIC
> configuration.
>
> So, any thoughts on the code? I have some questions.
>
> What initialization am I missing?
>
> What's the right ifdefery? I'm thinking a CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT that is
> independent of CONFIG_ARM_VIRT_EXT.
>
> Are there folks who want to run Linux in secure mode? Would documenting in
> Kconfig that they can do this by leaving CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT undefined be
> sufficient support for this?

We currently tend to run Linux in Secure SVC mode, and this has worked
fine for a long time, and I think this is because these chips have
reset defaults that allow us to access everything in secure mode, but
I don't know if we'd need to suddenly deal with having to configure
everything to also handle non-secure mode as well.

I our hope here is that if you know you're starting in secure svc mode
on armv7a, and have virtualization extensions, the kernel could
"elevate" itself to hyp mode, without too much work, but it looks like
on (at least) rk3288 we need to do something to the GIC at a
minimum.

>
> Is it fine or bad to leave the CPU in undefined mode when one of the extension
> or privileged operations fails? It's only for maybe a dozen instructions until
> safe_svcmode_maskall.
>
> How should CPU mode recording be handled? Should the CONFIG_ARM_SEC_EXT code
> set __boot_cpu_mode with an extra bit specifying the security setting and then
> the CONFIG_ARM_VIRT_EXT code set-if-unset?
>
> What should the secure monitor stub leave behind? Right now it's different
> than the hypervisor stub: put the address of the code you want run in monitor
> mode into r4, make the secure monitor call, and make sure your code makes an
> exception return when finished.
>
> Whatever is left behind, I think it should allow the GIC driver to enable
> non-secure access to the hardware if Linux was booted in secure mode.
>
> If this code can be evolved and tested to the point where it's mergeable, then
> Linux can finally interact intelligently with the features introduced by the
> security extensions and only has to depend on firmware and bootloaders getting
> the implementation defined aspects of a system right, taking care of the
> architectually specified stuff itself when sufficiently privileged. Among
> other things, this should lead towards the bootwrapper no longer being
> required to boot Linux on ARM's virtual platforms, which would make my life
> easier.

This would be great for us, because we tend to have our firmware do
the bare minimum possible, and this would allow people running
upstream kernels on ChromeOS systems to easily use virtualization if
they wish.

>
> Thanks,
> Christopher
>
> --
> Employee of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
> Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
> hosted by the Linux Foundation.
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